Approved For Release 2004/01/21: CIA-RDP80M01082A000800040003-1 DCI/IC 74-087 6 June 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR: 25X1 SUBJECT : State Reporting 1. After discussing the subject with Danny Graham yesterday, it appears useful to take a new run at the problem before writing a DCI-Kissinger letter. We need to decide in this building in fairly precise terms (a) what is wanted, (b) what we can realistically expect State as an institution to do to help, and (c) what we unilaterally do to get it. A generalized bleat is not going to contribute much. 2. We are already launched on parts of this, but someone else will have to help DDI and DCI decide what if anything they will do. There are a lot of things that need to be done in this building first. a. If State reporting can be documented as falling off since the Kissinger instruction (and it was his personal wish), we should have the figures, and should be able to say authoritatively that the intelligence product has suffered, or to show instances where DDO has been tasked to collect essentially overt items as a consequence of a State failure or refusal. b. Refinement of the "requirements" process is already underway and continues in parallel with all else. Essential, but it does not solve the problem, only improves prospects to a certain extent. c. DDI should make increased use of the existing channels for levying specific requests on State reporting. As long as that channel is as seldom used as now appears to be the case, our arguments are weakened. In this connection, I would note that use of the channel actually achieves several useful things at once: 1) It compels DDI to state needs much more specifically (which is what virtually every State official I have talked with says is the element missing from previous and ongoing requirements lists).

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- 2) The priority of the "requirement" gets specific review in DDI and at the geographic bureau in State, which helps double-check its timeliness.
- 3) It goes to the field as a State cable, i.e., a formal tasking of the mission. This is perhaps the only way in which the intelligence house will be able to get this kind of endorsement on its "requirements." It also tends to ensure that all assets at a mission will be called into play.
- d. Arrive at some decisions on what, if any, additional steps this side of the house is willing to take to get at information, i.e., some of the things mentioned in my earlier memo or others of that sort.
- e. Arrive at some concise decisions on what we want from the State structure. Among the possibles are:
  - 1) Accept the CIRL as a "requirement" subject to audited reporting levies. Not likely, especially until after the CIRL refinement process is more advanced or completed.
  - 2) Do something about ensuring that official-informal and telephone data gets into the machine. OK, but generalized and not subject to much really effective action. Perhaps some form of exhortation would be as much as we could hope for.
  - 3) Ask for early planning with intelligence about nmeds for specific negotiations. A good point and should be made early and perhaps independently. Do we have a case study which shows either the benefit of doing it, or the penalties for not?
  - 4) Ask for some form of counterbalancing State instruction on factual reporting, or a heavy endorsement of the CIRL lists. Achievable, but we need a better CIRL list and some evidence that intelligence has been hurt by the regime in effect these last several months.

3. There may be other things we want from State which should be included. In the interim, I am continuing talking to a variety of people there, getting reactions and ideas. Thursday I will see Bill McAfee (acting for Hyland who is tied up on the Presidential visit) and also Dean Brown's staff man. I will continue to keep all this "informal" but it is getting to be understood that at the least I must be preparing to write some kind of staff study for the DCI on the general subject of reporting/intelligence interface. This is not at all harmful, as far as I can see.

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TC Staff

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